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The developing world invites Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to their countries nearly unconditionally for 
the developmental benefits. However, in literature there are concerns regarding ‘unfettered FDI’ in terms 
of several factors including FDI outflows which contribute to Current Account Deficits. This paper in-
vestigates the relationship between FDI and profit outflows on the case of Turkey via economic causality 
analysis through Granger causality test using a method developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and the 
impulse-response analysis. The results indicate that although there are short-term positive effects of FDI 
inflows in terms of current account financing, the causality results point to the long-term adverse effects 
of FDI inflows on profit remittance leading to current account deficit, which is an issue that policy makers 
should consider when trying to attract FDI.
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1. Introduction
The formal definition of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) by the IMF (1998) is as follows:
 “...a category of international investment made by 
a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) 
with the objective of establishing a lasting interest 
in an enterprise resident in an economy other than 
that of the investor (direct investment enterprise). 
‘Lasting interest’ implies the existence of a long-
term relationship between the direct investor and 
the enterprise and a significant degree of influence 
by the direct investor on the management of the di-
rect investment enterprise.”
Such ‘lasting interest’ of FDI together with the facts 
that the debt crises in the 1980s reduced the foreign 
bank loans availability as a financial resource and 
also the short term portfolio investment, another 
possible financial resource, created several finan-
cial crises in the 1990s has made FDI a unique fi-
nancial source for developing countries. Hence, the 
developing world has invited FDI to their countries 
nearly unconditionally for developmental purposes 
offering a range of incentives, such as ‘financial and 
tax incentives’ as well as ‘market preferences’ in or-
der to attract FDI. However, in literature there are 
concerns regarding ‘unfettered FDI’ in terms of sev-
eral factors including FDI outflows which contrib-
ute to Current Account Deficits (CAD). It is argued 
that if the right kind of FDI in the right amounts is 
to be attracted by the developing countries in order 
to maximize the benefits from FDI for developmen-
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tal purposes, effective state should be there to man-
age the process (Singh, 2005: 12). In this regard, in 
order to avoid financial fragility stemming from the 
‘unfettered FDI’, which makes the economic struc-
ture prone to crises, the amount and timing of FDI 
would need to be monitored and regulated by the 
governments. It is argued that aggregate foreign ex-
change inflows and outflows, both in the short and 
long run, which stem from the large FDI projects 
that may generate a ‘time profile’ of these outflows 
(in the form of dividend payments or profits trans-
action) and inflows, could be time inconsistent. In 
this regard, this time inconstancy can cause liquid-
ity crises and even solvency crisis with the worst 
consequences for economic development as seen in 
Asia (Singh, 2005: 9-10). 
In this regard, this paper investigates the relation-
ship between FDI and CAD through profit out-
flows on the case of Turkey via economic causality 
analysis and the impulse response analysis. Such 
an analysis and evaluation in the regard of Turkish 
case are original and try to fill the gap in the exist-
ing literature. To do this, unit root tests for test-
ing the stationary of data for Turkey are examined 
first and then the economic causality of FDI profit 
outflows with FDI inflows is analyzed by Granger 
causality tests, using a method developed by Toda 
and Yamamoto (1995: 225-250). This is followed 
by an impulse-response analysis with the variance 
decomposition test. In this regard, the paper is or-
ganised as follows. After the background part that 
tackles the eras of 1980s and 1990s with the FDI 
Characteristics in Turkey, a brief literature review 
is done; in the second part, the data set is described 
with the descriptive statistics and in the last part, 
the economic causality is conducted with the im-
pulse-response analysis followed by the variance 
decomposition test.
2. The Background Era: The 1980s and the 
1990s with the FDI Characteristics in Turkey
Through the liberalisation trend in the 1980s, the 
developing world including Turkey started to im-
plement liberalisation and privatisation policies, 
which promoted capital inflows into these coun-
tries. These capital flows in the first years of the 
1980s following the late 1970s were mostly in the 
form of syndicated, variable rate foreign bank loans 
denominated in major currencies, mostly in dol-
lars, which is called ‘petro-dollars’, due to the fact 
that these dollars were gained from the dramatic 
increase of oil prices made by the Organization of 
Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC), which led 
to the oil crises in the 1970s. IMF (1998) explains 
that “The capital flows that took place between the 
first oil crisis of 1973 and 1982 were linked to the 
recycling of oil revenues” (IMF, 1998: 59)1. However, 
following the 1982 debt crisis, the structure of capi-
tal flows to developing countries started to change 
from bank lending to FDI and portfolio investment 
(Eichengreen, Fishlow, 1998: 24) as seen in Table 1. 
This process was accelerated by the liberalisation 
and privatisation programs in developing countries. 
Schmukler and Zoido-Lobatón (2001) put the situ-
ation as follows: “Deregulation, privatization, and 
advances in technology made FDI and equity in-
vestments in emerging markets more attractive to 
firms and households in developed countries. The 
1990s witnessed an investment boom in FDI and 
portfolio flows to emerging markets” (Schmukler, 
Zoido-Lobatón, 2001: 2).
Table 1 Composition of Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries (in million dollars - on average 
and % of the total flows - on average)
Type of Flow 1973-81 1982-1989 1990-97
Bonds 1,216.1
(4%)
   1,370 
    (5.4%)
      22,261




    (40.6%)
    17,008.5
     (12.4%)
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 7,506.9
(26%)
  13,369.1
    (52.7%)
    79,820.7
     (57.9%)
Portfolio Equity 31.8
(0%)
      328
    (1.3%)
    18,643.3
     (13.5%)
Source: Author’s research; WB Global Development Finance Data (Edition 2010)
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The restructuring of the world economy, which start-
ed in the 1980s through the policies of liberalisation 
and deregulation of financial markets continued into 
the 1990s, under the name of ‘globalisation’. This was 
by virtue of the significant developments in ICTs and 
in the political arena through having entered a new 
unipolar world order after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In this regard, the 1990s globalisation, which 
has already left the ‘global village’ stage, brought new 
dimensions to the countries – whether economic, 
social and political restructuring, making them 
“open”, never seen before in the world economy. In 
other words, “global economic activity is significantly 
greater relative to domestically-based economic 
activity than in previous historical periods and im-
pinges directly or indirectly on a greater proportion 
of national economic activity than ever before” (Per-
raton et al., 1997: 274). However, such ‘openness’ has 
created several vulnerabilities for economies in terms 
of crises through various channels, such as CAD. Ta-
ble 2 summarizes some of the 1990s globalisation 
tendencies stated above. 
Table 2 Some Indicators of the Globalisation of the 1990s 
Item
Annual Growth Rate (per cent)
1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000
FDI inflows 23.6 22.1 39.4
FDI outflows 25.9 16.5 35.6
FDI inward stock 15.1 8.6 16.0
FDI outward stock 18.1 10.6 16.9
Cross-border M&As 32.0 15.7 62.9
Sales of Foreign Affiliates 19.7 8.8 8.1
Gross Product of Foreign Affiliates 17.4 6.8 6.9
Total assets of Foreign Affiliates 18.1 13.7 18.9
Exports of Foreign Affiliates 22.2 8.6 3.6
Employment of Foreign Affiliates (Thousands) 5.5 5.5 9.7
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (in current prices) 9.5 5.9 1.3
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 10.0 5.4 1.1
Royalties and Licence Fee Receipts 21.1 14.6 8.1
Exports of Goods and Non-factor Services 11.6 7.9 3.7
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report (2009)2
As Table 2 shows, both international trade (ex-
ports) and FDI, some of the indicators of the glo-
balisation of the 1990s, had grown relatively faster 
than world output since the mid-1980s. Follow-
ing the tendencies in the 1980s, the structure of 
capital flows to developing countries continued to 
be in the form of FDI and portfolio investment as 
seen in Figure 1.
Figure 1 Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries
Source: Author’s research; WB Global Development Finance Data (Edition 2010) 
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Among these developing countries, since the 
1980s Turkey has implemented liberalized poli-
cies for attracting FDI3. In this regard, Akpolat 
and Inancli (2011) put the liberalization process 
in Turkey as follows: “Turkey is one of the emerg-
ing economies which have changed its trade and 
investment regimes in the early 1980s. Turkey 
carried out this transformation by adopting a new 
liberal macroeconomic framework. Turkey, as 
many developing countries, has implemented for-
eign capital-promoting policies. Obstacles which 
prevent foreign capital to enter into Turkey have 
been removed gradually” (Akpolat, Inancli, 2011: 
57). Moreover, by passing the Foreign Direct 
Investment Act (No. 4875) in 2003 the foreign 
capital regime of Turkey continued to be highly 
liberalized. Hisarciklilar et al. (2010)4 commented 
on the importance of this law with the follow-
ing words: “With this legislative change, invest-
ment climate has been made more favourable for 
the entries of foreign firms. The Act guarantees 
non-discriminatory treatment, with equal rights 
for foreign and national investors. The FDI Act 
removed the screening and pre-approval proce-
dures for FDI projects, redesigned the company 
registration process so that it was equal for do-
mestic and foreign firms, facilitated the hiring 
of foreign employees, included FDI firms in the 
definition of ‘domestic tenderer’ in public pro-
curement, granted foreign investors full convert-
ibility in their transfers of capital and earnings 
and authorized foreign persons and companies 
to acquire real estate in Turkey...” (Hisarciklilar et 
al., 2010: 4).
It can be said that thanks to such liberalized poli-
cies, in addition to several other factors, Turkey had 
an upward trend in FDI inflows for the period of 
1990-2017, as seen in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 FDI inflows, US$ million, 1990-2017
Source: Author’s research; UNCTAD, FDI/MNE database, available at: www.unctad.org/fdistatistics
However, when Turkey’s performance in attracting 
FDI inflows is observed in detail in Figure 2, it can 
be said that although in this period Turkey’s ability 
to attract more FDI into the country seems remark-
able, it mostly stems from the period 2004-2010 in 
which mass privatisation, which attracted brown-
field investments (M&As) of FDI, was experienced. 
Onis (2011) explains this fact as follows: “...The ma-
jor boom in privatisation revenues occurred in the 
post-2004 era, which corresponds with the start of 
formal negotiations with the European Union for 
full-membership. ...illustrates the fact that priva-
tisation and foreign direct investment are highly 
interrelated phenomena” (Onis, 2011: 711). In this 
period Turkey also benefitted from the macroeco-
nomic policies that were implemented to ensure 
macroeconomic stability after the country’s finan-
cial crisis in 2001, during which a dramatic increase 
in FDI inflows is also noticeable in Figure 2, as a 
result of the “fire sale” of local firms. In this regard, 
Kazgan (2012) puts this issue as following words: 
“Until 2001, which is the severest crisis year of Tur-
key that ever experienced, it [FDI inflows] annually 
remained at a value such as an average of 800 odd 
million dollars, which can be ignored. [On the other 
hand] While the stocks market bottomed out at the 
crisis year of 2001, it peaked up at 3.3 billion dollars. 
This means (due to the accelerating exchange rate 
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Figure 3 Percentage share of brownfield and greenfield investments of FDI inflows into Turkey, annual 
average 1990-2010
Source: Author’s research; UNCTAD, FDI/TNC Database (2010) and UNCTAD Cross-border M&A Database (2010)
Figure 4 Percentage share of brownfield and greenfield investments of FDI inflows into developing 
world, annual average 1990-2010
Source: Author’s Research; UNCTAD, FDI/TNC Database (2010) and UNCTAD Cross-border M&A Database (2010)
and bottoming out the stock prices) the taking over 
of the local firm stocks at these lower prices by the 
foreigners. If the stocks to be sold at 10 dollars in 
normal conditions are sold at 5 dollars it is clear that 
this is a significant capital loss. In this regard, in the 
crises of 1994 and 2000-2001 a significant share of 
banks, tourism firms and food industry were taken 
over through this way” (Kazgan, 2012: 253).
Moreover, as seen in Figure 3 for the 1990-2010 
period, FDI inflows mostly entered Turkey as 
brownfield investments, namely, via cross-border 
M&As, rather than new greenfield investments. 
This was contrary to the rest of the developing 
world in terms of the entry mode of FDI5, as seen 
in Figure 4. 
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Figure 5 FDI inflows and FDI profit outflows (in US$ and in logarithmic transformation), 1990-2014
Source: Author’s Research; Central Bank of Turkey
3. A Brief Literature Review
Although in literature there have been large theo-
retical (Dunning, 1994; Milberg, 1999; Chudnovs-
ky, Lopez, 1999) and empirical works on FDI and 
economic development/growth7 (Balasubraman-
yam et al., 1996; Borensztein et al., 1998; Agosin, 
Mayer, 2000; Carkovic, Levine, 2005; Hermes, Len-
sink, 2003; Samimi et al., 2010 and Adeniyi et al., 
2012, etc.), there are few works pointing out the po-
tential detriments of the FDI inflows, including the 
profit outflows of FDI. The latter happens mostly 
by increasing CAD and leads to financial fragility 
and prone-to-crisis economy (Seabra, Flach, 2005; 
Mahnaz, Salma, 2013; Geyikdagi, Karaman, 2013; 
Akkermans, 2017). Among these, Seabra and Flach 
(2005) deal with the issue in terms of the Brazilian 
case using the Granger causality test developed by 
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) in order to investigate 
the causal relationship between FDI and profit re-
mittance, which finds out a unidirectional causality 
running from FDI to profit outflows. According to 
the empirical results of their paper, FDI causes prof-
it remittance by pointing out the significant possi-
ble adverse long-term effects of the FDI attraction 
policies of Brazil. Mahnaz and Salma (2013) deal 
with the issue on the case of Pakistan using Au-
toregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) approach in 
order to determine the long-term and short-term 
relationships between FDI inflows and income out-
flows, which are found to be co-integrated, pointing 
out a long-term relationship. According to the em-
pirical results of their paper, FDI inflows in Pakistan 
have negative implications for current account bal-
ance as well as positive effects on growth and em-
ployment. Geyikdagi and Karaman (2013) deal with 
the issue in terms of the Turkish case by investigat-
ing FDI inflows to Turkey and trying to estimate 
Moreover, Kazgan (2012) notes that although there 
was not any upward trend of direct fixed capital 
investments of FDI inflows from 1995 till 2003 ex-
cept for the crisis years, there was an upward trend 
of the FDI outflows from Turkey, which were over 
2 billion dollars for the severest crisis years 1999-
2001, and in 2003, almost equal with the FDI in-
flows (Kazgan, 2012: 253). When the FDI profit 
outflows is added to this picture, as seen in Figure 
5, then it turns into a significant issue that should be 
paid attention to by the policy makers. Figure 5 in-
dicates the upward trends of both FDI inflows and 
FDI profit outflows. Moreover, Figure 5 underlines 
that especially in 2009, in the year in which Turkey 
was experiencing the Global Crisis, while FDI in-
flows were dramatically decreasing, the FDI profit 
outflows were increasing.6
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the transfer of profits. The results of their regres-
sion analysis using the annual data of 1995-2011 
show that as the FDI stock remains positive, profit 
transfers are positive. Although they found a small 
impact on profit repatriation, they stress that this is 
due to transfer pricing manipulation of FDI, which 
should be paid attention to besides the M&As kind 
of FDI (Geyikdagi, Karaman, 2013). Different from 
other authors, Akkermans (2017) deals with the is-
sue of ‘repatriation of profits’ in terms of the ‘drain 
of wealth’ aiming at describing and explaining ‘net 
profit flows’ per country for the period 1980-2009 
through a panel data analysis. In this regard, the pa-
per, in which a dataset on ‘net profit flow’ per coun-
try is calculated, investigates the ‘net profit flow’ 
as a consequence of foreign investment stocks for 
the period 1980-2009 for the three world-system 
groups, such as core, semi-periphery and periphery 
and finds that the net profit inflow grew for core 
countries, net profit outflow grew for the semi-
periphery and in particular the periphery, conclud-
ing that “...neoliberalism served core countries and 
TNCs well. To be precise: it served capital owners 
in the core well; workers in those countries have not 
benefited at all...” (Akkermans, 2017).
It can be interpreted from the findings of the em-
pirical studies on FDI and its spillovers8 or growth 
that there is not such a rule that FDI will create the 
spillovers in every host country, although in theory, 
FDI is accepted to have important positive effects 
on the economy of the host country, such as “1-pro-
motes economic growth and development, 2-raises 
employment and wages, 3-generates technological 
spillovers that raise productivity, 4-provides export 
market access, 5-leads to improvement in the bal-
ance of payments” (Milberg, 1999: 100). In this re-
gard, it is criticised as the benefits of FDI depend on 
the conditions of the host developing countries and 
the Multinational Companies (MNCs) themselves 
and the characteristics of their investments. So 
such benefits are difficult to measure and also are 
not uniform. Moreover, when the positive impact of 
FDI inflows on the balance of payments are consid-
ered, it is underlined that the profit outflows of FDI 
can offset the positive impact or even transform it 
to the negative impact on the balance of payments 
in the long run. 
In this regard, Willet et al. (2004) maintain that 
there are not just short-term effects, but FDI also 
can create volatility in capital movements, contrary 
to the expectations, as experienced in the Asian cri-
sis countries (Willet et al., 2004: 30). The crisis ef-
fect of the short-term capital inflows, the so-called 
hot money, as leading to CAD by appreciating lo-
cal currency and creating virtual welfare increase 
were widely examined in the literature. Compared 
to them, FDI was accepted as more innocent and 
beneficial for the host country. However, FDI has 
recently started to be criticized in terms of its pos-
sible crisis effect through time inconsistencies of 
the transfers of its profits, which are from the host 
country to home country.
Lall (2000) underlines that if the government is not 
strong enough in both regulating and bargaining 
on FDI, then it will cause ‘unequal distribution of 
benefits or abuse of market power’ by MNCs (Lall, 
2000: 8). Milberg (1999) contributes that by virtue 
of the development and high liberalization of finan-
cial markets of the developing economies, FDI can 
easily be hedged, which contributes to diminish-
ing the difference between them and the portfolio 
investments more than ever before and so gives it 
the capability of creating financial crises by being 
unstable and volatile (Milberg, 1999: 101). Singh 
(2005) argues that to avoid the financial fragility, 
stemming from the ‘unfettered FDI’, which makes 
the economic structure prone to crises through 
CAD, the governments would need to monitor and 
regulate the amount and timing of FDI. He stresses 
that the aggregate foreign exchange inflows and 
outflows, both in the short and long run, which can 
stem from the large FDI projects, can create a ‘time 
profile’ of these outflows (in the form of dividend 
payments or profits transaction) and inflows, which 
could be time inconsistent. In this regard, he under-
lines that this time inconsistency can cause liquidity 
crises and even solvency crisis with worse conse-
quences for economic development as seen in Asia 
(Singh, 2005: 9-10). In this regard, since restrictions 
of such outflows are not regarded as ‘smart poli-
cies’, rather than imposing restrictions, incentives 
that achieve the same result, but this time volun-
tarily, would be among ‘smart policies’. As China9 
did, incentives towards reinvestment of FDI profits 
such as tax incentives by governments would be 
efficient in order to prevent the adverse effects of 
FDI inflows on profit remittance leading to CAD. 
Moreover, such incentives also divert the reinvest-
ment to specific sectors, which are vital for devel-
opment. OECD (2000) puts China case as follows: 
“...To encourage reinvestment of profits, China has 
been offering FDI a refund of 40 per cent of taxes 
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paid on its share of income, if the profit is reinvest-
ed in China for at least five years. Where profits are 
reinvested in high-technology or export-oriented 
enterprises, the foreign investor may receive a full 
refund...” (OECD, 2000: 15). Moreover, not restric-
tion of profit outflows but managing the time of 
such outflows can be arranged by governments. But 
before it, the domestic residents, who think to make 
profit remittance, should inform the government in 
advance, e.g. two weeks before the arranged date of 
such outflow for the amounts higher than, for in-
stance, one million dollars. 
4. Data Set
A monthly data set, both in US$ and in logarith-
mic transformation, including the era of 1991m12-
2017m8 is used in the research. The data source is 
the Central Bank of Turkey. Table 3 indicates the 
symbols, definitions, units and scales of all variables 
used in the research.
Table 3 Explanations of the Variables 
Symbols Definitions Units and Scale
lnFDIPO NATURAL LOGARITHM OF FDI PROFIT OUTFLOWS 
US Dollars
Millions
lnFDIINF NATURAL LOGARITHM OF FDI INFLOWS 
US Dollars
Millions 
Source: Author’s Research; Central Bank of Turkey
5. The Economic Causality Between lnFDIPO 
and lnFDIINF for the Turkish Case
With regard to the Turkish case, the causal link 
between FDI profit outflows and FDI inflows is 
analyzed by Granger causality tests, using a method 
developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). This is 
designed to improve the standard F statistics in the 
causality test process after examining the unit root 
properties.
5.1 Unit Root Tests: Testing Stationary
The VAR model covers the period of 1991m12-
2017m08. In order to determine the maximum 
order of integration of each series, stationary tests 
of the variables have been conducted by the most 
common method, Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit 
root test (ADF), which was developed by Dickey 
and Fuller (1981). It is as follows:
ΔYt =a + bt + γY(t-1) + cΣΔY(t-1) + ut 
The basic model was as follows:
Yt = pY(t-1) + ut  or  yt – y(t-1)= (p-1) y(t-1)+ ut       (ut is the 
stochastic error term)
Namely;  Δyt = γy(t-1)+ ut
If (p-1) = 0 or γ = 0 then it can be concluded that 
yt series has a unit root, namely, it is not stationary 
on its level. 
To test the null hypothesis, yt has a unit root, al-
ternative versions of the model are used as follows:
Dickey-Fuller Equation without Intercept and 
Trend:
ΔYt =γY(t-1) +ut 
Dickey-Fuller Equation with Intercept but Without 
Trend:
ΔYt =a+γY(t-1) +ut 
Dickey-Fuller Equation with Intercept and 
Trend: 
ΔYt =a+bt+γY(t-1) +ut 
The obtained test results of the ADF, which is au-
tomatic based on the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) in Table 4 are as below:
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Intercept With Trend 
(Constant, Linear Trend)
Level
LNFDIINF 10/10/10   0.822029 -0.624781 -1.924770
LNFDIPO 12/12/11 0.920110 0.459670 -1.070362
First Differential
Δ LNFDIINF 9/9/9 -7.491843a -7.555531a -7.543043a
Δ LNFDIPO 11/11/11 -11.92833a -11.94879a -11.96229a
The superscript a denotes significance at the 1% critical level. The lag orders are computed according to AIC. The series 
marked with (a) do not exhibit a unit root at 1% significance level.  
Source: Author’s research.
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5.2 The Interpretation of the Results 
According to the results in Table 4, it is concluded that 
LNFDIINF and LNFDIPO are not stationary on their 
levels, they are integrated of order one, namely, I(1), 
for lag 9 and for lag 11, respectively. The stationarity 
of the series was also checked by the graphs of the 
series as seen in Figure 6. According to these graphs, 
all series seem unstationary, which can stem from the 
breaks in the crisis periods. These variables, which are 
integrated of order one, are used in the VAR model in 
order to have the maximal integration order as one10.
5.3 Test for Granger – Causality with Toda and 
Yamamoto Modified Wald Test 
In the second step, the following augmented 
Granger causality test suggested by Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) is performed11. The application 
of the procedure leads to a point where the usual 
test statistics for Granger causality exhibit stand-
ard asymptotic distributions. A modified Wald 
test (MWald) for restrictions on the parameters 
of a VAR (k), where k is the lag length in the sys-
tem, is utilized by the procedure that was devel-
oped by Toda and Yamamoto (1995). When a VAR 
(k+dmax) is predicted (where dmax is the maxi-
mal order of integration to occur in the system), 
this test displays asymptotic chi-square distribu-
tion. It is also shown that if variables are integrated 
of order d, the usual selection procedure is valid 
whenever k≥d. The lag length order in the VAR 
model is determined as 12 according to the AIC 
criterion.
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 The Null hypothesis χ2 Statistics P-Value χ2 Statistics P-Value
LNFDIPO does not Granger cause LNFDIINF  15.65929 0.2073 17.57140 0.1293
LNFDIINF  does not Granger cause LNFDIPO  28.02340 0.0055a 31.52826 0.0016a
The superscript a denotes significance at the 1% critical level.  
Source: Author’s research
Table 5 VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria




 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -803.4208 NA   2.330008  6.521626  6.550042  6.533066
1 -611.9165  378.3566  0.510493  5.003373  5.088621  5.037694
2 -574.2623  73.78405  0.388728  4.730869  4.872949  4.788071
3 -530.9641  84.14219  0.282788  4.412665   4.611577*  4.492749
4 -522.7198  15.88776  0.273244  4.378298  4.634043   4.481263*
5 -516.5024  11.88098  0.268396  4.360344  4.672921  4.486190
6 -514.7993  3.226989  0.273455  4.378942  4.748351  4.527669
7 -512.6047  4.122643  0.277511  4.393560  4.819802  4.565169
8 -511.2560  2.511836  0.283572  4.415028  4.898102  4.609517
9 -500.2466  20.32499  0.267972  4.358272  4.898178  4.575642
       10 -494.8394  9.894939  0.264993  4.346878  4.943616  4.587129
       11 -490.0015  8.774842  0.263269  4.340093  4.993663  4.603226
       12 -477.6048   22.28391*   0.246040*   4.272104*  4.982506  4.558117
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
Source: Author’s research
The following VAR (k+dmax=13) model is estimat-
ed by OLS and SUR methods. 
 (1)
 (2)
After determining that the most appropriate lag 
length as k=12 and dmax=1, the causal link be-
tween FDI Profit Outflows (lnFDIPO) and FDI In-
flows (lnFDIINF) series based on p values for the 
modified Wald (MWald) statistics are presented in 
Table 6.
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5.4 The Interpretation of the Results 
According to the estimation results, FDI Profit Out-
flows (lnFDIPO) and FDI Inflows (lnFDIINF) are 
causally related in the long-run, and the Granger 
causality is uni-directional running from FDI In-
flows to FDI Profit Outflows in the Turkish Case. 
This finding is consistent with the Seabra and Flach 
(2005) findings about the Brazilian Case. As already 
noted, although there are short term positive effects 
of FDI inflows, the causality results point to the long 
term adverse effects of FDI inflows on profit remit-
tance leading to CAD. In addition, previous FDI in-
flows are the driving force of current profit outflows. 
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses of the vari-
ables, namely, how two variables react to each other 
in the next 8 months. Considering the Impulse Re-
sponses of the profit outflows, namely, when there is 
shock to FDI inflows, it can be seen that after three 
months profit outflows are always positive and grow-
ing. Since most of the FDI inflows to Turkey is in 
brownfield FDI formation (Sarialioglu Hayali, 2012), 
the three-month period for profit outflows makes 
sense and points to the fact which policy-makers 
should consider since the issue, the relationship of 
brownfield FDI with the profit outflows in a short 
time, is put by UNCTAD (2000) as follows:  
“The impact of profit repatriation and transfer pric-
ing on financial flows and the balance of payments 
of a host economy may differ according to the mode 
of entry. On the one hand, outflows of earnings are 
likely to begin sooner with M&As than with green-
field FDI when the acquired firm is profitable —
though they may take longer where an affiliate has 
to be restructured” (UNCTAD, 2000: 146). 
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Source: Author’s research
When it is looked at the Variance Decomposition 
of Profit Outflows shown in Table 6 it is seen that 
in the short run, an impulse (innovation/shock) to 
lnfdipo accounts for 93% of fluctuations in profit 
outflows as its own shock, while shock to lnfdiinf 
accounts for 7% of fluctuations in profit outflows. 
However, in the relatively long run a shock to lnf-
diinf can account for 20% of fluctuations in profit 
outflows. 
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Table 6 Variance Decomposition of Profit Outflows
 Variance Decomposition of LNFDIPO:
 Period   S.E LNFDIPO LNFDIINF
 1  0.800166  100.0000  0.000000
 2  0.844968  99.99569  0.004307
 3  0.907521  99.86504  0.134961
 4  0.947165  93.23837  6.761629
 5  0.981397  86.89533  13.10467
 6  1.001175  83.64686  16.35314
 7  1.024132  80.57270  19.42730
 8  1.036298  79.03863  20.96137
Source: Author’s research
6. Conclusions
Aggregate foreign exchange inflows and outflows, 
both in the short and long run, which can stem from 
the large FDI projects, may generate a ‘time profile’ 
of these outflows (in the form of dividend payments 
or profits transaction) and inflows, which could be 
time inconsistent. So, it is argued that to avoid such 
financial fragility stemming from the ‘unfettered 
FDI’, which makes the economic structure prone to 
crises through CAD, the governments would need 
to monitor and regulate the amount and timing of 
FDI, since this time inconstancy can cause liquidity 
crises and even solvency crisis. Although there are 
short-term positive effects of FDI inflows in terms 
of current account financing, the causality results 
of the paper with regard to the Turkish case, con-
sistent with the existing applied works, point to the 
long-term adverse effects of FDI inflows on profit 
remittance leading to CAD, and thus possibly to 
crisis economy. Previous FDI inflows are the driv-
ing force of current profit outflows. Considering the 
Impulse Responses of the profit outflows, namely, 
when there is shock to FDI inflows, it can be seen 
that after three months, profit outflows are always 
positive and growing. Since most of the FDI inflows 
to Turkey is in brownfield FDI formation, the three-
month period for profit outflows makes sense and 
points to the fact which policy-makers should take 
into consideration. When considering the policies 
for current account deficit, attention should be paid 
to the fact that large capital inflows have the poten-
tial to turn into large profit outflows. In this regard, 
China’s incentives towards reinvestment of FDI 
profits can be inspiring for the Turkish case. 
It is argued that if developing countries want to at-
tract the right kind of FDI, in the right amounts, 
and to maximize the benefits from FDI, they must 
have an effective state, i.e. government structures 
(Singh, 2005: 12). In other words, this can only be 
done by effective states that manage the process, 
namely, get full information about the intention of 
profit remittance in advance and make timetables 
for such profit remittance of foreign companies in 
order to prevent time overlaps. When making this 
time arrangement, using incentives should be on 
the agenda again in order to turn the unfavourable 
transfer time for such companies into favourable 
ones. Of course, at the very beginning, such kind 
of states should be in cooperation with such foreign 
companies. In this regard, thanks to such coop-
eration, before the profit remittance such foreign 
companies, themselves, would like to reinvest their 
profits. OECD (2000) exemplified this with China 
“Many foreign companies invested in China have 
adopted a strategic plan, which requires reinvest-
ment of profits for growth and expansion” (OECD, 
2000: 15). 
Last but not least, in order to avoid the financial 
fragility, stemming from the ‘unfettered FDI’, which 
makes the economic structure prone to crises, the 
governments would need to monitor and regulate 
the amount and timing of FDI, not just ‘hot money’.
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Endnotes
1 Petro-dollars were deposited to such lender banks in the developed countries by OPEC, and were recycled by such banks by having 
underwritten syndicated bank loans to the developing countries, which needed new capital inflows to be able to pay for oil imports 
(Dodd, 2002: 3).
2 UNCTAD (2009), “World Investment Report”.
3 See the Turkish Republic Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury (1998) for Foreign Capital Legislation, which started to be 
gradually liberalized in the 1980s.
4 Hisarciklilar, M., Gultekin-Karakas, D., Asici, A.A. (2010) “Can FDI Be A Panacea For Unemployment?: The Turkish Case”, available 
at: http://www.esam.itu.edu.tr/NottinghamWorkshopPapers/Hisarciklilar-Karakas-Asici-NW.pdf (Accessed on: January 2, 2012).
5 One of the indicators of the ‘quality’ of FDI is the ‘mode of entry’ into the host country (greenfield vs. brownfield investments), in 
order to have direct positive impact on economic development through investment, namely, increasing gross fixed capital formation. 
In this regard, it is maintained that when the FDI is realised by acquisition of existing assets in the host country and/or merger, it is 
called ‘brownfield investment’. It does not create the required addition to the capital stock, output or employment if they only lead 
to a change of ownership without adding to productive capacity or productivity, especially compared to the ‘greenfield investment’. 
Greenfield investment leads to a net addition to the host country’s capital stock. Moreover, in brownfield investment, when there is 
no entirely new productive capacity, the technology spillover can also be seen as relevant (Milberg, 1999: 107). According to London 
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Economics (2010), its impact on economic growth through increasing capital stock is problematic, it can be less certain and less 
accepted than the impact of greenfield investment, at least in the short-run (London Economics, 2010: 23).
6 When the monthly data is considered, it becomes clearer that in some months, for instance 1993m5, 1994m5, 1995m1, 1996m5, 
1997m5, 1998m5, 2001m5, montly FDI profit outflows exceeded the monthly FDI inflows.
7 Hermes and Lensink (2003) argue that, in addition to the direct increase of capital formation of the host country, FDI also can help 
increasing growth by introducing new technologies, managerial skills, ideas, and new varieties of capital goods (Hermes and Len-
sink, 2003: 143). All these can create spillovers.
8 The term ‘spillover’ is defined as ‘the beneficial effects of inward FDI are contagious in host countries, both within and across countries’ by 
Milberg (1999: 109). In theory, spillovers can be created by ‘demonstration and/or imitation’, which means new products or techno-
logies of multinational companies (MNCs) are imitated by local firms. It can be by ‘competition’, which means local firms get under 
pressure to adopt new technologies after the entrance of MNCs to the markets. It can be by ‘linkages’, which means transactions 
between MNCs and local firms. It can also occur by ‘training’, which means that local firms invest in their human capital through 
developing the skills and knowledge of their employees to make them adapt to the new technologies that MNCs developed (Hermes 
and Lensink, 2003: 143). According to Chudnovsky and Lopez (1999), technology spillovers can be gained by developing countries 
from MNCs in four ways: “through FDI; through joint ventures between domestic firms and MNCs (including what has been termed 
‘strategic partnerships’); by purchasing technology in contractual form (patents, licensing, turnkey contracts, etc.); and through reverse 
engineering, imitation, copying, etc. (in this case, without the consent of MNCs)” (Chudnovsky, Lopez, 1999: 7).
9 OECD (2000) comments China’s tax incentives as follows: “Tax incentives, which are among the most outstanding investment 
promotion policies, were also made available for FDI. From 1980 to 1993, China used extensively a wide range of tax incentives, 
including income tax exemption and reduction, tariff-free for imported equipment and construction materials. Although in 1994 the 
unified taxation system applying both domestic and FDI firms was introduced, a five-year tax refund scheme was granted for FDI 
firms, and tariff-free treatment was extended. In addition, preferential treatments were granted in some specific sectors and indus-
tries. Currently, the targeted economic sectors and industries in which FDI is encouraged include agriculture, resource exploitation, 
infrastructure, export-oriented and high-technology industries” (OECD, 2000: 15). 
10 Before the causality test, the Johansen test of cointegration is conducted since both series were found to be integrated of order one. 
Both the trace statistic and maximal eigenvalue statistic indicated that there is cointegration between variables by rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no cointegrating vector (r=0) at the 1% significance level, whereas the null hypothesis of at most one cointegrating 
vector (r£0) cannot be rejected. So, the results support the hypothesis of cointegration between profit outflows and FDI inflows.
11 If the data are integrated or cointegrated, the usual tests applied for exact linear restrictions on the parameters (e.g. the Wald test) 
do not exhibit usual asymptotic distributions. In order to handle this aspect, and not to get into the pre-testing distortions associated 
with prior tests for non-stationarity and cointegration, the procedure proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) is chosen.
Ayca Sarialioglu Hayali
Odnos izravnih stranih ulaganja  
i tekućeg računa platne bilance: slučaj Turske
Sažetak
Zemlje u razvoju pokušavaju na sve načine privući izravna strana ulaganja kako bi ubrzale svoj razvoj, a 
ponekad ne postavljaju gotovo nikakve uvjete. Međutim, u literaturi se izražava zabrinutost zbog „neome-
tanih izravnih stranih ulaganja” s obzirom na nekoliko čimbenika. Jedan od njih je odljev dobiti, čime se 
povećava deficit tekućeg računa platne bilance. U radu se analizira odnos izravnih stranih ulaganja i odljeva 
dobiti na primjeru Turske putem analize ekonomske uzročnosti, odnosno Grengerovim testom kauzalnosti 
uz upotrebu metode koju su razvili Toda i Yamamoto (1995) i analize impulsnog odgovora. Iako prema 
rezultatima izravna strana ulaganja imaju kratkoročan pozitivan učinak na financiranje tekućeg računa, 
rezultati kauzalnosti ukazuju na to da izravna strana ulaganja imaju dugoročne negativne posljedice na 
tokove dobiti i uzrokuju deficit tekućeg računa platne bilance, a na to bi donositelji odluka trebali obratiti 
posebnu pozornost.
Ključne riječi: izravna strana ulaganja, odljev dobiti, slučaj Turske 
